THE DYNAMICS OF THAI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDO-CHINA
1938-1950
---------------------------------------------
1.Thailand’s long-standing political and strategic
interests in Indo-China
Thailand’s foreign policy towards Indo-China in the period
between 1938 and 1950 was formulated and executed by Thai leaders who took
special account of their country’s long-standing political and strategic
interests in that Peninsula.
First, Thailand possesses an interest in Indo-China because
of its longstanding strategic importance. For several hundred years Indo-China
had been a pawn in a competition for power and security between Thailand and
Vietnam.
In the Eighteenth and early Nineteen Centuries in
particular, these two rival states were in contention for control over Cambodia
and Laos. In their dealings with Vietnam, Thai rulers regarded Laos (as a
geographic expression) and Cambodia as the key to the security of Thailand.
The importance of these two small neighboring states derived
from their geographical positions, the use of which by any enemy would pose a
serious threat to Thailand’s independence and territorial integrity.
The danger arising from a strong, hostile power established
in strength in Indo-China as a whole was confirmed when Thai rulers were obliged
to deal with France who replaced Vietnam as Thailand’s adversary.
Thus apart from the importance of Burma, Indo-China
constituted the key to Thai security interest in the area as a whole.
In the classical balance of power practice, Thailand was
concerned either to exercise control itself over Laos and Cambodia or to deny
control of these two states to any third states, established in Indo-China.
Secondly, Thailand possessed an interest in Indo-China
because the people of Laos and Cambodia had racial, religious and linguistic
links with the Thais.
The Lao people were akin to the Thais in race and religion.
The Cambodian had religious, but not linguistic, links with Thailand.
They did not have either linguistic or religious ties with
Vietnam, where the local form of Buddhism was Mahayana and not Hinayana.
Moreover, Thai rulers held the belief that Laos and
Cambodia, with their shortage of harbors and poor communications, would not be
able to maintain their independence.
They would be absorbed either by Thailand or Vietnam. But,
given their common race, Laos and Cambodia would more likely turn to Thailand
rather than Vietnam.
Given this view, the Thai rulers were keen to integrate Laos
and Cambodia into Thailand to prevent their adversary from assuming regional
dominance. But, if their goal could not be realized, they hoped to maintain a “buffer
zone” in Laos and Cambodia interposed between Vietnam.
Thirdly, interest in Indo-China was reinforced from the
later part of the Nineteen Century when the French became the dominant power in
the Peninsular.
Moreover, the Thais were never reconciled to the cessions of
territories in Laos and Cambodia which the French had exacted between 1867 and
1907.
From the Thai point of view, these territories were taken
from Thailand by force or the threat of force and they had a just cause for
their restoration.
As a consequence, a strong anti-French feeling developed in
Thailand and an irredentist movement arose to reclaim all territories that had
at any time formed part of the Thai Kingdom.
2.Phibunsonggram Government Shared the Perception of Thailand Political
Interests and the Strategic Calculus of Its Forebears
In conducting Thai foreign policy towards Indo-China in the
period between 1938 and 1944, the Phibunsonggram Government shared the
perception of Thailand’s political interests and the strategic calculus of its
forebears.
Furthermore, in dealings with regional and extra-regional
states, the Phibunsongggram Government inherited the traditional Thai practice
of the balance of power.
In foreign policy terms, this meant seeking to prevent undue
dominance by maintaining a state of equilibrium between contending outside
forces.
It also involved playing off one side against the other in
order to achieve Thailand’s overall aim of maintaining its independence and
protecting strategic interests in Indo-China.
3.The Success of the First Phibunsonggram Government in
the Sphere of Foreign Affairs
The first Phibunsonggram Government(1938-1944) had been
highly successful in the sphere of foreign affairs.
In addition to securing retrocession of French Indo-Chinese
territory in 1941, in 1943 it obtained the transfer by the Japanese of the
Burmese Shan states of Kengtung and Mongpan and the Malay states of Kedah,
Perlis, Trengganu and Kelantan.
The successful conduct of Thai foreign policy towards
Indo-China was due in the main to efforts made by the Phibunsonggram Government
to draw Japan into support of its irredentist policy.
The foreign policy of Thailand, which had been centered on
Great Britain and France, its powerful colonial neighbors, took into account a
third important factor in the shape of the Japanese Empire.
In the circumstances, Thailand not only deferred to Japan,
but also was ready to play it off against Great Britain and France, and vice
versa.
The Phibunsongggram Government sought to profit from the
change in the regional balance of power particularly at the expense of France.
4.The Phibunsonggram Government Maintained the Balance
Between Britain and Japan
When Non-Aggression Pacts were signed on June 12} 1940 with
Great Britain and France, and a Treaty of Friendship was signed on the same day
with Japan, the Phibunsonggram Government maintained the balance between
Britain and Japan but clearly showed its determination to take advantage of
France’s weak position to regain lost territories in Indo-China.
In negotiating the Non-Aggression pact with the French, the
Phibunsonggram Government took advantage of friendly attitude of Britain to
secure a concession from France. It profited from the tactics of playing off
one side against another.
The success of this tactic was enhanced by Japan’s southward
advance from China and the rise of Thai nationalism, irredentism
and”Pan-Thaiism” at home.
These internal and external factors challenged the political
positions of both Britain and France in Asia, and the two powers were obliged
to come to terms with Thailand.
5.The French Concession Along the Mekong River
The French concession took the form of agreement to
re-adjust the boundaries along the Mekong River.
Confidential and secret letters were exchange when the
Franco-Thai non-aggression pact was signed on June 12, 1940.
The contents of these letters were significant for they
confirmed that France had agreed to move the Tai-Lao boundary along the Mekong
River to the line of the thalweg and to recognize any territory on the western
side of the thalweg as Thai.
In other words, any islets close to the Thai side shore
would belong to Thailand for administrative convenience although the Thais
recognized all islands as part of French Indo-China.
The Whole Situation in Indo-China Was Transformed With the
French Defeat in Europe
With the French defeat in Europe in June 1940, the whole
situation in Indo-China was transformed.
The makers of foreign
policy in Bangkok sought to revise Franco-Thai relations. They declared
themselves dissatisfied with what they had gained from Franco-Thai Non-Aggression
Pact.
The agreement, together with its confidential
correspondence, promised too little for growing Thai irredentist aspirations.
The Thais used the presence of Japanese troops in the north
of Indo-China as an opportunity to revive their irredentist policy.
In effect, the Thais
had designs on all of Cambodia and Laos including those parts which the
French had acquired between 1867 and 1907.
Their interest in absorbing Cambodia and Laos was motivated
by a fear of a revival of conflict with Vietnam and a desire to deny control of
Laos and Cambodia to either Vietnam or Japan.
This view reflected the long-standing Thai strategic
interest in Indo-China, sustained by prior dealings with Vietnam and later
France.
6.A Crisis Over the Indo-China-Thailand Border
Thai determination to prosecute this irredentist policy
provoked a crisis over the Indo-China-Thailand border and a short-lived war in
which the Thais regained territories in Laos and Cambodia, which had been lost
to France in 1904 and 1907.
It marked the first time since the colonial era that Thai leaders
had employed both diplomacy and force as means to achieve foreign policy
objectives.
Initially, the Thai Government entered into direct
negotiations with France. Then having failed to persuade the French to
subscribe to its demands, the Thai Government adopted an offensive diplomacy.
Its objective was to draw the attention of other Powers to
Thailand’s territorial demands. These Powers were Great Britain, the United States,
Japan, Germany and Italy.
The Thais obtained a sympathetic response from Japan,
Germany and Italy, which counter-balanced a hostile attitude from the United
States and Great Britain.
The interest of the latter two Powers lay in the maintenance
of the status quo in Indo-China in spite of the fact that Great Britain adopted
a flexible attitude towards it.
7.Thailand’s Good Chance to Play Off One Side Against the
Other
In this circumstances, the makers of foreign policy in
Bangkok were provided with a good chance to play of one side against the other.
This tactics was employed in the full when the
Phibunsonggram Government sent “Special Goodwill Missions” to the interested
Powers.
In particular a “Special Goodwill Mission”, to Hanoi and
Tokyo led by Deputy Minister of Defense and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the
Army Colonel Luang Phromyodhi, was engaged in this offensive diplomacy.
This mission did not succeed in persuading the French to
adopt Thailand’s offer of collaboration with the French against Japanese
aggression in Indo-China in return for France’s retrocession to Thailand of two
enclaves across from Luang Prabang and Pakse.
But, when the mission arrived in Tokyo in September 1940, it
generated anxiety among the authorities in London that the mission might
discuss Japan’s military demands on Thailand including the establishment of air
and naval bases in Thai territory.
This anxiety contributed to the great advantage to Thailand in inducing Britain to
adopt a flexible attitude towards the maintenance of the status quo in
Indo-China.
Britain became sympathetic to Thai demands for two enclaves
across from Luang Prabang and Pakse.
Despite Britain’s approval of Thailand’s “small-scale
demands”’ the Thais did not think they could achieve these by entering into
direct negotiations with the French. Neither could Great Britain help the Thais;
nor could the Thais change America’s rigid attitude towards the maintenance of
the status quo in Indo-China.
When the Phibunsonggram Government’s offensive diplomacy
showed no prospect of achieving its irredentist aims, the Thai Army and Navy
became dissatisfied with the Thai Premier’s conduct of foreign policy.
There were indications that resignation from office would be
forced upon him. Should he be obliged to resign, an alternative choice of the
Army and the Navy for the office of Prime Minister was either Vice-Admiral
Sindhu Songgramchai, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, or Phaya Phahol, the
former Prime Minister.
8.Domestic Political Pressure Forced Thai Premier Work More Closely with Japan
Because of this domestic political pressure, the Thai
Premier, who wished to retain power, became determined to deal more closely
with Japan.
In exchange for support for Thailand’s irredentist policy in
Indo-China, he made a verbal commitment to Japan on October 1, 1940 to the
effect that Thailand would no longer pursue a policy of neutrality but would
allow its territory to be used by Japan in the latter’s plan to attack Malaya
and Burma via Thailand.
To balance this verbal commitment to Japan, the Thai Premier
contrived a week later to employ Great Britain as countervailing power.
He sent a secret agent, Colonel Luang Kharb Kunjara, to
Singapore to assure the British military authorities that Thailand would resist
Japan should she attempt to attack Malaya and Burma via Thailand.
9.An Undeclared War Between Thailand And French
Indo-China
When a balance of power was believed to be attained, the
Thai Premier, who was backed by an effective propaganda campaign at home,
employed forces as an instrument of irredentist policy.
On November 18, 1940, an undeclared war between Thailand and
French Indo-China broke out. The tide of war went against the French who Tried
but failed to reinforce their troops from other French territories.
Before Japan intervened diplomatically on January 20,1941,
the Thai Supreme Command claimed that they
had occupied all territory of Luang Prabang which Thailand claimed and
an area in Cambodian extending 40 kilometers from the frontier.
Thai press reports alleged that all Laos and Cambodia would
have been taken but for Japanese mediation which served to check Thai
ambitions.
10.Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941
By the Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941, Thailand
secured only a part of the territories in Laos and Cambodia which it had demanded
and less than that which its armies were said to have occupied.
It recovered part of
the territory lost to France in 1940 and 1907, but had to agree to the
establishment of a demilitarized zone and to provide monetary compensation to
France.
In consequences, there was a feeling in Thailand that Japan
was a foe rather than a friend. This feeling derived from Thai dissatisfaction
with Japan’s role as mediator and Japan’s evident determination to exercise
influence over Thailand’s political and economic affairs.
11.Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Between Thailand
and Russia
Indeed it was Thai dissatisfaction with, and distrust of}
Japan that led to a restoration of diplomatic relations between Thailand and
Russia, which had lapsed after the overthrow of the Tsar.
It was the Thai intention to use the Soviet Union, in
addition to Great Britain, to counter-balance Japanese ambition.
While in Berlin, Colonel Prayoon Phamonmontri, the leader of
a Thai mission to Europe, was urged by the Thai Premier to proceed at all speed
to Moscow to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union.
As a result, the restoration of diplomatic and commercial
relations between Thailand and the Soviet Union was announced in Moscow on March 12, 1941, a day after the French
Indo-China border agreement was initiated in Tokyo.
Despite the optimism generated by this agreement, the Soviet
role never matched Thai expectations.
12.Indo-China Had Changed in Thai Perception
In the period between the cessation of the Franco-Thai conflict
and the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, Indo-China had changed in
Thai perception from being a zone of opportunity to one of menace because of
Japan’s forward movement from July 1941.
Thai foreign policy towards French Indo-China was then
influenced much more by the role of Japan than by that of France.
In other words, Japan had come to replace France as Thailand
potential adversary in the Peninsular. France, who had expressed willingness to
co-operate with Japan in the Peninsular, no longer constituted a significant
factor in Thai calculation.
13. A Foreign Policy of Neutrality Had Been
Adopted by Thailand
Nevertheless, Thailand, in its foreign policy and diplomacy,
still sought desperately to maintain a state of equilibrium between contending
outside forces.
A foreign policy of neutrality had been adopted in response
to the Japanese treat from the direction of Indo-China.
The Phibunsonggram Government had never thought of using its
weakened armed forces to resist the Japanese as to do so without external
support would only be suicidal for Thailand.
More significantly, the Thai armed forces had been weakened
as a result of the Franco-Thai War, and there was no way to replenish their
strength.
Owing to lack of war materials, the Thai leaders were of the
opinion that Thailand was not capable of resisting the Japanese by force of
arms if they proceeded to violate their neutrality in order to strike at
Britain in Malaya and Burma.
14.A Policy of Absolute Neutrality was merely An Ideal
Course
To prosecute a policy of absolute neutrality was merely an
ideal course. Its success was linked to the attitude of the United States and
Great Britain whose joint political and military efforts were believed to match
those of Japan.
The Thai elite had also tried in vain to draw the attention
of the Soviet Union to the game of “the balance of power” in South-East Asia.
The Phibunsonggram Government promised to sell the Soviet
Union Thai goods including tin, rubber and wolfram, in response to the Soviet
appointment of Nikolai Yakovlevich as Russian Minister to Thailand in June
1941.
Well aware of the Thai tactic of seeking to employ the Communist
Power as a countervailing factor against it, in the third week off July 1941,
Japan urged Thailand to sever its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union for its part had negotiated a Neutrality
Pact with Japan in April 1941. On Lune 22, it was attacked by Germany but Japan
remained neutral.
In these circumstances, the makers of Thai policy in Bangkok
surrendered all hopes of relying on the Soviet Union. Instead, they sought to
base their policy on Great Britain and the United States in the prospect that
these two Powers would do their best to counter Japan’s influence.
15.Thailand Needed the Support From Great Britain and
United States Before the Outbreak of The Pacific War
As the Thais shared a strategic perspective with Britain,
they maintained that they would certainly fight to preserve their neutrality if
they had the means of doing so, but that without such means they would be
obliged to yield to force majeure.
It was apparent that whether or not Thailand would oppose the
Japanese depended in the main on whether Britain and the United States would
come to the rescue of Thailand and supply it with war materials.
But when the Thai Government approaches the United States
and Great Britain for assistance, nothing concrete was promised.
Although Great Britain offered limited military co-operation
in the Kra Isthmus in the event of a Japanese incursion into Thailand it could
not alone give any guarantee to protect Thailand as a whole, since it did not
possess the necessary forces.
In the early days of December 1941, Great Britain was engaged
in consultations with the United States as to the possibility of a joint public
warning by both governments that if Japan went to war with Thailand it would
find itself at war with both the United States and Great Britain as well.
On December 6 and December 7 respectively personal messages
to this general effect were sent by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill to the Thai Premier. These messages did not arrive in time.
The Thai Premier had no way of knowledge in advance of these
messages which would have constitute what he might have deemed appropriate
support for the successful continuation of a policy of neutrality.
He thought that Thailand had been isolated by the two great
Powers. He also realized that in the absence of any real prospect of adequate military assistance, Thai
resistance could not be counted upon.
He was therefore disposed to give up his determination to
defend Thailand’s neutral position and reverted to being dependent upon a
single dominant Power---Japan.
16.Thailand’s Bamboo or Reed Policy Used in The Previous
Periods
In the circumstances his tactic was to “bend with the wind”
which was based on the Thai belief that whenever the angry wind blows, bamboos
or reeds that bend with the direction of
the wind survive, whereas big trees that do not, will break.
In conducting foreign policy, therefore, if external
pressure and demands were too strong to resist without support from external
friends, the Thai decision-makers had no choice but to accommodate to such
external pressure and demands for the sake of their country’s survival and
independence.
This ”bamboo or reed”policy had been conducted by previous
Thai decision-makers for centuries. It had been the foreign policy of the Thai
kings in the capitals of Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Thonburi and even early Bangkok”.
For example, they sent tributes to China, the single
dominant Power of the day, in return for the latter’s non-interference in their
country’s internal and external affairs.
The policy was also pursued by King Mongkut (Rama IV)and
King Chulalongkorn(Rama V) during the heyday of Western colonialism in Asia.
At the time the Chakri kings opened up the country and
grated territorial concessions and extra-territorial rights to Great Britain
and France when they realized that their
tactic of playing off one enemy against the other faced failure.
17.The Alliance Approach Employed by Thailand
The Phibunsonggram Government executed the “bamboo or reed”
policy on December 8,1941, when it ordered a cease-fire and allowed the passage
of Japanese troops through Thailand.
The course of action adopted by the Phibunsonggram
Government was not lacking in justification; the Western Powers could not
afford support, the strength of the Japanese was overwhelming, and resistance could
have bought only devastation. It can be claimed that the action of the
Phibunsonggram Government saved the country from the ruin which afflicted its
neighbors.
Accordingly, from December 21} 1941 onwards, the
Phibunsonggram Government employed an alliance strategy as a means to maintain
the country’s independence and to further its interests in French Indo-China
and the British Empire in South-East Asia.
The Phibunsnggram Government concluded an offensive and
defensive alliance with the Japanese on December 2. On January 25, 1942,
Thailand formally declared war on Great Britain and the United States, though
the United States Government disregarded the declaration and at no time treated
Thailand as a belligerent.
Close co-operation with Japan in the political field was
necessarily adopted, and recognition was given to the independent state of
Manchukuo, to the puppet Chinese Government at Nanking, and to the Japanese
sponsored independent state of Burma. Bangkok was the original center of S.C.
Bose’s Indian Independence League and Indian National Army.
18.The Alliance Approach Achieved its Objective
The alliance approach achied its objective in maintaining
Thailand’s independence as, throughout the Pacific War, the Thais retained their own
army, police and administration.
However, the approach failed to advance their interests in
Indo-China. Thailand obtained some territorial reward for its collaboration
with Japan in 1943.
This took the form of the four Unfederated Malay States of
Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, as well as the two Shan States of Kengtung
and Mongpan in British Burma.
Except for the cessions of the territories provided by the
Franco-Thai Peace Convention of May 9, 1941, Thailand did not acquire any
territory from French Indo-China.
Laos and Cambodia, which the Thais badly wanted, remained
part of French Indo-China. It was chiefly Cambodia and the “T’ai States” on the
east bank of the Mekong River which Thai irredentists wished to recover.
Moreover, the return of the latter territories would have
opened the gate for Thailand’s connection with 20 million souls of T’ai race in
Southern China and upper Tonkin.
The gift which Japan made to Thailand of the four Malay
States and of two unimportant Shan States did not console the Thai Premier and
his followers. They felt that they had been fobbed off by Japan.
19.A Traditional Policy of Balance of Power Returned
Again
A failure in traditional policy objective in Indo-China
prompted the Thai Premier to reconsider the relationship with Japan and to
contemplate a traditional policy of balance of power exemplified by his efforts
to organize an anti-Japanese underground movement and to send military agents
to contact the Allies in China.
This flexibility and pragmatism in the conduct of foreign
policy was also influenced by the fortune of the war.
As it became evident that the tide of war had begun to turn
strongly against Japan, especially starting in 1943, the Thai Premier sought to
look for an alternative.
In July 1944, in line with this new policy, the Phibunsonggram
Government introduced two bills in the People’s Assembly to establish a new
capital in northern province of Phetchabun and to create a Buddhist sacred city
in the central province of Saraburi.
Premier Phibunsonggram planned to use Phetchabun as the new
capital while launching military operations against the Japanese.
20.Premier Phibunsonggram Tendered His Resignation
In the People’s Assembly, however, the Phibunsonggram
Government could not explain the rationale of these two bills for fear of
retaliation from Japan.
The two bills were there defeated. And the Phibunsongggram
Government’s initiative in seeking to shift Thailand’s political affections
from Japan to the Allies undermined the political standing of the Thai Premier
in Tokyo.
Japan gave the green light to a considered attempt in the
People’s Assembly to oust him from the office by members of the Free Thai
Movement, led by Pridi Banomyong, even though Japan knew to some extent about
their anti-Japanese underground work.
As a result, the Thai Premier and his Government tendered
their resignation on July 24, 1944. The Free Thai Government was formed and
headed by Khuang Aphaiwong, with Pridi behind the scenes.
This Government declared a policy of promoting friendly
relations with Japan. However, until the end of the Pacific War, it did not
regard Indo-China as matter of high priority. Rather its first priority was to
work with the Allied Powers in fighting against Japan to liberate Thailand and
win back its independence.
21.Thai Foreign Policy Designed to Retain the Ceded
Territories in Indo-China After the
Pacific War
After the Pacific War Thailand’s relations with France
returned to a condition of stress and strain. The object of contention was the
territories acquired by Thailand in Indo-China by the Franco-Thai Convention of
May 9,1941. T
he overall attitude of immediate postwar Governments in
Thailand to the boundary with French Indo-China was no different in essentials
to that of the pre-war Government of Phibunsonggram.
Thai decision –makers had never been reconciled to the
cessations of territories which the French had exacted between 1867 and 1907.
They felt it necessary to retain the acquired territories in order that they
should serve as a buffer zone between Thailand and post-war France who returned
to Indo-China.
Postwar Governments in Bangkok were not successful in
retaining those territories because of the absence of external support.
The relevant great Powers were limited in number to only
Great Britain and the United States. Thailand did not attract support from
either of them.
Indeed they both insisted on Thailand returning the disputed
territories to France. Moreover, although diplomatic relations between China
and Thailand were established for the first time in Thai history, Sino-Thai
relations were still cool which therefore ruled out the possibility of Thailand
soliciting Chinese assistance.
The Thais tried to attract Russian attention without success
because the Communist Power was much more interested in developing friendly
relations with the new socialist government in France.
As the relevant great Powers were limited in number, the
makers of Thai policy were provided with little chance of playing off one side
the other.
In the prewar period, the Thais had sought to play off Great
Britain against France whenever they were in dispute with the French. After the
Second World War, however, Britain’s position in Thailand had suffered with its
being cast in the role of an ”oppressor” in demanding free rice in Thailand, and
because of its decision to help the French get back the disputed territories
unconditionally.
Given the tension in Anglo-Thai relations, the Thais turned
to the United States for assistance to counter French demands and pressure, but
without success.
22.Thailand Used
the Indo-Chinese Independent Movement as Countervailing Power
In conducting a policy designed to retain the ceded
territories in Indo-China, Thai decision-makers, whose chance to play off one
Western Power against the other was limited, were well aware of their military
and economic weakness in comparison with the French.
But they were aware of the rise of militant nationalism in
Indo-China. The Thais therefore sought to draw the Indo-Chinese independence
movement into Thailand’s scheme of things as a means of countervailing Power.
These movements were the Viet Minh (League for the
Independence of Vietnam), Lao Issara(Free Lao), and Khmer Issarak (Free
Cambodia).The Thai sought to exploit these movements for the purpose of denying
French dominance in Indo-China.
23.The Failure of the policy to keep intact the ceded
territories in Indo-China
In November 1946, the policy to keep intact the ceded
territories in Indo-China failed. In view of the determination of the French
coupled with the British and American pressure, the Thai Government accepted
demands to hand over the ceded territories to the French authorities.
The Thai Government accepted the French demands in order to
safeguard the main objective of its foreign policy which was to become a member
of the United Nations. The Thai Government was aware that failure to reach
agreement with the French would result in their vetoing Thailand’s entry into
that organization.
When Thailand signed an agreement of Settlement and Protocol
to bring to an end to the dispute between the two states, France withdraw its
objection to the admission of Thailand to the United Nations.
Thailand became a member in November 1946. The former
boundary with Indo-China was restored but a mixed conciliation commission was
appointed by the two Governments to consider whether it required any
rectification from the ethnic, geographic and economic points of view.
Since political and historical considerations were excluded,
and because of the quasi-independence the French had conferred on Cambodia and
Laos within the Indo-China federation, on June 27, 1947, the commission led by
Williams Phillips(the American) recommended only certain changes, and thus the
outcome was entirely favorable to the French.
The Thai Government, which had pressed claims to the whole
of Laos and the Cambodian province of Battambang, refused to recognize this
decision.
24.Thailand Conducted A Buffer States Policy
When the findings of the Franco-Thai conciliation commission
went against Thailand, the makers of foreign policy in Bangkok, whose policy of
integration Laos and Cambodia now faced failure, then sought to formulated a
buffer states policy.
This new policy was hinted at by Pridi Banonyong, then an
Elder Statesman. In Washington and Paris, Pridi suggested to the French that
Thailand might drop its claims to the disputed territories and accept a
French-proposed “Pan South-East Asia Union” if and when full independence was
granted to Cambodia and Laos.
But, the Union should, Pridi suggested, consist initially of
a free Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and a Vietnam associated with France in A
French Union.
Undoubtedly, Pridi was of the opinion that with Vietnam
virtually under the control of France and the establishment of fully independent
Laos and Cambodia, the latter states could serve as an interposing buffer
between Thailand and French controlled Vietnam.
Pridi’s tactic reflected a traditional Thai attitudes to
Indo-China, i.e. if the Thais could not control Laos and Cambodia themselves,
they would try to deny that control to any other threatening power. However,
Pridi’s buffer states policy was opposed by France for obvious reasons and by
public opinion in Bangkok because it was interested in getting back the
disputed territories instead of being subservient to the French.
The Thai Government reacted by taking a strong stance
against the French exemplified by efforts to assist nationalist forces in
Indo-China against them. In conjunction with these forces, the Thais supported
a proposal for a “South-East Asia League” which was formed in Bangkok on
September 8, 1947.
For Thai political leaders such as Pridi Banomyong, the
South-East Asia League was seen as instrument to bring about unity among the
peoples of South-East Asia for the ultimate aim of removing the French from
Indo-China and other colonial Powers from the rest of the region.
25.Thailand’s
Favorable Attitude Towards The Soviet Union
The adoption of this anti-French policy, coupled with
resentment against the Western Powers for their attitude towards the Indo-China
boundary, prompted a more favorable attitude towards the Soviet Union.
In September 1947 the Lord Major of Bangkok attended an
international conference of municipal leaders in Moscow, and in March 1948 a
Soviet Legation was established in Bangkok. This favorable attitude towards the
Soviet Union was motivated by the traditional desire to play the game of “the
balance of power.”
It also reflected Pridi banomyong’s view that the Soviet
Union was likely to play an increasing role in the affairs of South-East Asia.
26.Thai Foreign Had A Negative Outcome for the Thai Civilian
Leaders
In the event, Thai foreign policy towards Indo-China after
the Pacific War had a negative outcome. The Thai civilian leadership’s close
association with the Communist elements in the nationalist movements(especially
the Viet Minh), coupled with its alleged favorable attitude towards the Soviet
Union, damaged its reputation with the British Foreign Office and the U.S.
Department of State.
Both Britain and the United States were concerned with the
regional dimension of international Communism. They looked around to support
Thai leaders who would take an inti-Communist and pro-Western stance.
Such leadership could not be found among Thai civilians such
as Pridi Banonyong, but was evident among the Thai military especially
Phibunsonggram, who returned to effective power after a coup d’etat on November
8, 1949.
27.Thai Foreign Policy Towards Indo-China Changed With
the Return TO Power of Phibunsonggram
With the return to Power of Phibunsonggram , Thai foreign
policy towards Indo-China changed. An ant-French policy was discarded and
replaced by one of reconciliation.
The Phibunsonggram Government, on May 27} 1948, publicly
accepted the recommendations of the Franco-Thai mixed Conciliation Commission
on the disputed territories in Laos and Cambodia and later on withdrew active
assistance to the Viet Minh, Free Laotians and Free Cambodians.
Franco-Thai relations improved considerably and the
recognition by the Phibunsonggram Government of French sponsored Governments in
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in February 1950 led to official relations becoming
more cordial than they had been for many years.
Thai foreign policy was revised as a result of a combination
of balance of power calculation and the domestic political interest of usurping
military establishment. That revision set the course of Thai foreign policy
towards Indo-China for the next quarter of a century.
In accepting the recommendation of the Franco-Thai mixed
Conciliation Commission and withdrawing assistance to the Indo-Chinese
Independence Movements, Phibunsonggram and his generals were influenced by a
concern to persuade the United States, Great Britain, Nationalist China and
France to accept a fait accompli their unconstitutional return to power.
To secure immediate recognition from these four Allied Powers
was of utmost political significance. Above all, it would legitimize the
Phibunsonggram regim and rule out the possibility of Pridi Banomyong’s return
to power with the aid of English and American friends (particularly the
Americans) who might act out of a sense of wartime loyalty.
28.Thailand’s Recognition of the Governments in
Indo-China
Thai recognition of the Governments in Laos, Cambodia and
Vietnam had been brought about also by fears of Communist China, concern about
its links with the Chinese community in Thailand and the Free Thais, and the
promise of the United States aid in arms and dollars.
By obtaining American aid, Phibunsonggram and his generals
strengthened their position and settled more firmly in the saddle, with all
benefits that this entailed.
In recognizing the three French-sponsored Governments in
Indo-China, Thailand had followed the lead of the United States and Great
Britain, which were perceived by Phibunsonggram and his generals as decisive
source of countervailing power against Communist China.
In the light of his perception of Communist China’s threat,
Phibunsonggram concluded that the fall of Indo-China would mean the fall of
Thailand, as it had to the Japanese after December 1941.
Accordingly, he wanted Great Britain and the United States
to join with France in the defense of Indo-Chia against the Communist threat
led by the Viet Minh and supported by China.
29.Indo-China As Thailand’s Zone of Forward Defense
In the circumstances, Phibunsonggram regarded Indo-China as
Thailand’s zone of forward defense. He was the same key decision-maker who had
determined the destiny of Thailand at the outbreak of the Pacific War.
He was still conscious of the threat posed to his country
through China and Indo-China. Before the Pacific War had broken out, the
Japanese at first set foot on China’s soil, then proceeded to Indo-China and
finally to Thailand.
With a tottering Indo-China next door, the Thai Premier
believed that, as in 1941, the fate of Indo-China would seal that of Thailand
but that Indo-China and thus Thailand could be saved by the joint intervening
efforts of the United States, Great Britain and France.
By upholding them as buffer states between Thailand and the
Chinese Communists, the Thai Premier foresaw that the three states in
Indo-China could protect Thailand’s independence. To that end, he committed
Thailand to an alliance with the Western Powers.
The source of that commitment was a strategic perspective of
longstanding significance. Indeed it indicated a line of continuity in policy which
had continued to distinguish Thailand’s approach to Indo-China.
